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ABSTRACT This paper discusses the contemporary sovereignty experience of small states and
territories in the context of unfolding ‘strategy games’. This paper charts and illustrates some of
the most salient issues over which this dynamic is played out, using binary (small state versus big
state) relations as its analytic constituency. These practices are understood as part of the
evolution of the conduct of government, or governmentality, as envisaged by Michel Foucault:
states, no longer concerned with threats to their very existence, can ﬂex their clout extra-
territorially, and in so doing provide new and creative opportunities, but also raise threats, for the
exercise of sovereignty.
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Introduction
States today are hardly preoccupied by concerns for their existence and survival qua
states, even in the face of the expansionist ambitions of stronger neighbours. State
extantism (see Schaﬀer, 1975, p. 25)—the 20th century exceptions here being
Somaliland, South Yemen and Zanzibar—means that even ‘failed states’ do not risk
their incorporation into the territory of an expansionist neighbour. Rather than
being gripped by the fear of domination or invasion, the key concern for the likes of
Nicolo Machiavelli (1515), states today are more disposed and prone busy to utilise
that key capacity of sovereignty—the right and ability to make laws—with a view to
‘optimize the health and wealth of the state and its people’ (Braun, 2000, p. 12).
Such a politically rational reading of the exercise of territorial power is
comparable to Michel Foucault’s concept of gouvernementalite´ (translated loosely
as governmentality): this implies the right and smart deployment of actual and
potentially available capacities to secure desirable resources, be they ﬁscal, human,
material, legal, or geopolitical (Foucault, 1991a, p. 93; Kuehls, 1996, p. 67). This is a
performative act of government-as-agency: referring to somewhat systematic modes
and technologies of power that go beyond the spontaneous exercise of control power
over others, and whose purpose is ‘the regulation of conduct by the more or less
rational application of the appropriate technical means’ (Hindess, 1996, p. 106).
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Such a state capacity extends naturally and legitimately to its own territories, its own
citizens and its own resources; indeed, these are often functions where the local state
has a monopoly, and this reach would be expected and largely respected by other
states. However, the regulation can also be deployed—indeed, perfected—in such
ways as to include extra–territorial reach scope, and to aﬀect the conduct of others
beyond one’s juridical scope; and the stakes get increasingly higher with decreasing size
of territory and population. Foucault describes these behaviour patterns and
relationships of power as ‘strategic games between liberties’ (Foucault, 1988a, p. 19);
they do not necessarily mean that power is exercised against the interests of the other
part of a power relationship, or that they result in a removal of liberty or options
available to individuals. Indeed, in the sense ascribed by Foucault to these terms, they
could, while somehow suggesting courses of action, actually result in an ‘empowerment’
of subjects, widening their decision-making options (also Lemke, 2001).
These possibilities thrust international relations into an arena of creative
governance and strategy games within the 21st century. The scenario is not only a
function of the large number of sovereign states that exist today, but also of the
expanding number and signiﬁcance of both subnational and supranational entities.
The stage is therefore set for conventional (state–state) bilateral and multilateral
deals, as well as for new forms of agreements and the para/proto-diplomacies that
imbricate sub/non-state territories and which have evolved from the metropolitan-
peripheral and colonial relationships of the 20th century. That such ‘creative
political economy’ (Baldacchino and Milne, 2008) is also bountiful (in frequency,
policy signiﬁcance and research potential) is also related to the increasing presence of
small, even micro, states, as well as of subnational (non-state, and mainly island)
jurisdictions, on the world stage. Smallness, often accompanied by islandness, low/
no populations and relative isolation, facilitates the room for imaginative and
strategic manoeuvre.
Scope
This paper discusses the contemporary sovereignty experience of small states and
territories in the context of unfolding ‘strategy games’ (see also Adler-Nissen and
Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2008). Based on its original use by Wittgenstein (1953) in
relation to language, the concept of a ‘game’ captures the messy amalgam of various
transactions, decisions and actions among players, as they struggle, explicitly or
surreptitiously, to ﬂex, impose or tease out their version of meaning or preference on
relational events, and not necessarily in rational ways. By deﬁning sovereignty as the
ability to do things and inﬂuence the conduct of others, we adopt an approach that is
sensitive to creative governance practices and a political economy that typically pits
a small state or territory with a larger, richer power.
This analysis is useful for various reasons. In applying the concept of
governmentality to small (often island) states and territories, it proposes to make
a conceptual and empirical contribution to existing knowledge and debates within
the study of political geography and sovereignty in general, and of the study of both
small states and subnational jurisdictions in particular. It also exposes the poverty of
certain established doctrines—often developed subconsciously with large candidates
in mind—when applied to small jurisdictions. Take Michael Porter and his diamond
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model, which maintains a signiﬁcant role for competition and rivalry between value
chains or clusters at the domestic level (Porter, 1991). Yet, the size and scope of a
small state’s domestic economy can be severely limited: it is thus often impossible for
small states and territories to create such a competitive milieu nationally. Instead, the
secret for their success is to become insiders of external market niches (Cho and
Moon, 2000).
The concept of governmentality helps us to better understand this predicament of
small jurisdictions, and what has also been called ‘the Singapore paradox’ (Briguglio
et al., 2009). It was proposed on 1 February 1978 in a lecture by Michel Foucault at
the Colle`ge de France, and has spawned considerable social science scholarship
since, particularly at the intersection of geography and politics (e.g. Burchell et al.,
1991; Walters and Larner, 2004; Crampton and Elden, 2007). With this concept,
Foucault reﬁned his earlier work to include an appreciation of power relations as the
‘conduct of conduct’ (Foucault, 2000, p. 341). Tout court, if power ‘does’ things to
and with people, then the techniques of rule are invariably tied to ‘technologies of the
self’; they are ‘processes by which the individual acts upon himself’ (Foucault, 1988b;
1993, p. 203).
Based in turn on a larger project (Baldacchino, 2010), this paper goes on to chart
and illustrate some of the most salient issues over which this dynamic is played out,
whether instigated bottom up (by the smaller/weaker player) or top down (by the
larger/more powerful player). Examples illustrating these dynamics have a global
reach. The threat of secession and full sovereignty is itself part of the baggage that
can be brought to bear in these dynamics, which can be fraught with drama,
international opprobrium as well as ‘development’ opportunities. The discourse
surrounding the subject matter—with references to small states and other small
subnational jurisdictions—also lends itself to political design.
Origins of the Small State
Interestingly, the labels used to deﬁne our subjects—if they can be called subjects at
all—are themselves highly charged and instrumentalised. Across disciplines and
concerns, small states have been rendered synonymous to chronically vulnerable and
problematic territories for which aid, assistance and especially favourable deals are
legitimate. References to ‘small states’ started becoming more systematic in the 1960s
after US-based political scientists in particular voiced concerns as to how these newly
independent entities would be both unable to execute even minimally their
international obligations, as well as being pesky and unreliable players in the
context of strategic, big-stakes, cold war superpower politics (Baker Fox, 1959; Vital,
1967; Keohane, 1969; East, 1973; Plischke, 1977). Small states have been seen as
synonymous with weak or failed states in the political studies/science literature,
lumping them in the same category with many larger developing countries. Even
today, the deﬁnition of a ‘small state’ in politics and international relations can
include such countries that are, or have felt, threatened by much larger neighbours:
Finland, Israel, Singapore and Taiwan (e.g. Gayle, 1986; Inbar and Shaﬀer, 1997;
Ingebritsen et al., 2006). Meanwhile, the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development has developed a speciﬁc programme dedicated to small island
developing states (SIDS) since 1994 (Hein, 2004). Most of these SIDS—the UN
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currently recognises 38—are remote, small in land area and population (less than
two million), with a very narrow resource base, fragile land and marine ecosystems
that are highly vulnerable to natural disasters, and open economies that are heavily
dependent on trade for national income. Finally, the 53-member Commonwealth
was galvanised into action after the US military intervention in one of its members,
Grenada, in 1983. Its concern with the vulnerability of a small but sovereign state to
external intervention or invasion (Commonwealth Consultative Group, 1985;
Diggines, 1985; Harden, 1985; Lyon, 1985; Bray, 1987; Bune, 1987; Charles et al.,
1997) has not really abated since, but evolved to consider issues of economic and
environmental sustainability (including climate change and sea level rise). This
strident ‘deﬁcit’ discourse surrounding small (and micro) states has found fertile
ground both in the vocabulary of small state policy-makers (who tend to believe
their own rhetoric), as well as among some mainstream neo-classical economic
advisors (Briguglio and Kisanga, 2004; but see Easterly and Kraay, 2000; Shaw and
Cooper, 2009, for an opposing view).
Such prejudices signal a tendency in the literature to consider ‘large states’ as
‘normal’, apart from preferable. Yet, this is hardly the case in practice. Out of 267
‘countries, dependent areas and other entities’ listed in the 2011 edition of the CIA
World Factbook (CIA, 2011), only 11 have populations exceeding 100 million, while
161 have populations of less than 10 million (of which 41 have a resident population
of under 100,000). Wikipedia has a list of 225 ‘countries by population’, including
subnational jurisdictions, which range in descending order from the People’s
Republic of China to Pitcairn: the median (113th) position is occupied by
Kyrgyzstan, with 5.4 million citizens (Wikipedia, 2011). Clearly, the so-called small
state is the typical state size (as it has also been for most of recorded history). By
contrast, therefore, it is the large state that is the quirk and the anomaly. Moreover,
there is also ‘no widely accepted deﬁnition of a small state’ (Crowards, 2002, p. 143);
nor is there a sharp or self-evident dichotomy between ‘small’ and ‘large’ states
(Baehr, 1975, p. 466).
Ambiguous Relations
Presumed smallness of states also creates ambiguity in relation to sovereignty.
Pitcairn (mentioned above) is not a sovereign state; it is, however, the world’s
smallest recognised subnational jurisdiction, the only remaining UK Overseas
Territory (UKOT) in the Paciﬁc. Moreover, its citizens (around 40) were deemed ﬁt
to submit complex legal challenges to the United Kingdom’s administration of the
island before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal, in the context of widely
reported child-sex abuse trials (e.g. Trenwith, 2003; Middleton, 2005). The three
most recently independent states in the Paciﬁc—the Federated States of Micronesia,
the Marshall Islands and Palau—have been deﬁned as ‘hybrid jurisdictions’ (Levine
and Roberts, 2005) because their status represents attempts to exploit the advantages
of both sovereignty and an autonomy supported by a benign and aﬄuent patron
state (in this case, the US). The contemporary political map is strewn with cases of
this second category of small jurisdictions: subnational (often island) autonomies;
and these non-sovereign examples far exceed the sovereign ones. Watts has identiﬁed
ﬁve categories of ‘forms of political relations which combine autonomy [read: self-
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rule] and partnership [read: shared rule] within federal political systems’ (Watts,
2000, pp. 23–29; 2008, pp. 33–38). Sovereignty is often treated as indivisible: you
either are sovereign or you are not, with no room for dithering in between. Yet, this
rule of thumb is increasingly found wanting in the 21st century. It maintains its grip
only in matters of jurisprudence. Lake (2003, p. 310) suggests a gradation or ‘a
continuum of increasing hierarchy in international relations.’ He adds that
‘anomalies may be more commonplace than we often realise’ (Lake, 2003, p. 314).
When Krasner (2001) speaks of ‘problematic sovereignty’, he refers not only to the
diﬃculty of classiﬁcation—what to do with Taiwan, Northern Cyprus or the
Palestinian Territories—but also to the nebulosity surrounding the workings of such
jurisdictions in international relations.
This ﬂexing of governmentality or the exploitation of jurisdiction oﬀshore for
strategic gain can be played with very diﬀerent intentions in mind. Each set of actors
would have its dynamics nested in a particular conﬁguration of geography, history,
culture and politics. Moreover, the contested jurisdictional terrain, ripe for ‘strategy
games’, would appear diﬀerently, depending on the perspective of either party.
Nevertheless, one can hypothesise that each set of such actors is likely to have
unequal players: a smaller, less powerful, less populated entity on one hand; and a
larger, richer, more populated entity on the other. The purposes for which such
contemporary ‘imaginative geographies’ (Said, 1979) may be deployed can also be
roughly generalised: they could deal with maximising tax revenue, increasing
tourism, ensuring security, attracting international students or foreign skilled
workers, or luring foreign investment.
Strategy Games Crafted by the Small
For the smaller player, the purpose of extra-territorial deals would be mainly to
secure, for example, pecuniary gain, military protection, currency stability, and
welfare supports via the drawing of rent and other surpluses from other jurisdictions
directly, or from the citizens thereof (Palan, 1998, p. 630, 2002, p. 154, 2003, p. 59;
Fabri and Baldacchino, 1999, p. 48). Also important is access to diplomatic channels
via direct international representation; and access to the labour markets and
citizenship rights of larger richer states. For those considering or boasting an
oﬀshore ﬁnance or electronic gam(bl)ing industry, extra-territorial links allow (at
least a semblance of) international oversight and regulatory supervision. Autono-
mous governments ‘choose’ to use some of their sovereignty-derived regulatory
powers in order to encourage non-local transnational actors—be they individuals,
corporations or other governments—to make use of, or invest in, or simply to
transfer funds to, their own regulatory environment (Hudson, 2000, p. 270). The
smaller faction, of course, never completely relinquishes the potential resort to the
metropole, if and when dire straits (such as budgetary shortfalls, economic
recessions, environmental disasters, over-population, labour surpluses, or labour
shortages) so determine or suggest. No wonder, therefore, that few of these smaller
territories have struggled for independence; most have waged intense diplomatic
struggles to maintain or extend benign colonial links with their overseas patron, at
times going so far—as demonstrated by Mayotte in 2009—as to press for
integration, the very antithesis of sovereignty (RFI, 2009). Various small states
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and territories today may have not just deployed, but actually traded in, their
sovereignty, or part thereof, in exchange for economic largesse, by exploiting this
limbo granted by peripherality. Palan (2002, p. 172) argues that they have gone so
far as to have prostituted their sovereign rights.
Non-sovereign, subnational units may have, and may exercise, their own right and
ability to make laws—which, granted, may have been devolved or bestowed formally
or constitutionally by sovereign states—in order to perform, or be crafted to
perform, this task. Many ‘dependencies’ of sovereign states have resorted to their
own agency or ‘actorness’ (e.g. Vlcek, 2008, p. 3) to develop strategy games, precisely
because they can do so, given that they have the right to make their own laws within
their territories: a crucial attribute of sovereignty that, however, can also be claimed
by, or accorded to, such subnational non-independent units (Palan, 2003, p. 21).
These candidates may have actually perfected the skill to a higher level, as their own,
often fuzzy and ambiguous, political status allows them to exploit more nimbly,
selectively and securely the spaces aﬀorded by going after rents, or ‘jurisdictional
shopping’, for other purposes. Many of these places embody the broad personalities
of federal or confederal cultures: a combination of self-rule and shared rule; of ‘leave
us alone’ along with ‘let us in’ on major decisions aﬀecting the national or collective
whole (Duchacek, 1986, p. 296).
Small subnational jurisdictions have managed to extract concessions, either within
the ambit of a larger, sovereign state and/or (typically in alliance with their patron
state) within the ambit of a confederate super-state, such as the European Union. Key
areas where such unequal arrangements have been secured to date regard: (1)
citizenship rights (with associated rights of residency, property purchase and work
permit); (2) indigenous self-government; (3) paradiplomacy; and (4) economic
sovereignty. All four areas question the strict deﬁnition of sovereignty and its imputed
exclusive powers and obligations: regarding single citizenship; equal rights for all
citizens; the rights of international representation; and local government transactions,
respectively. Examples are provided for each of these highly contested policy areas.
Citizenship Rights
Many small subnational jurisdictions forcefully lobby for and, once secured, defend
their right to maintain metropolitan passports and citizenship, which allows them to
access the mainland at will and without encumbrance. Such rights are especially
important in the face of very tight labour markets, as well as potential economic
crises or total environmental disasters. Yet the same territories have no qualms in
exercising very strict restrictions on who can work, settle, or purchase property on
their island; there is not even a quid pro quo.
Bermuda. The British Overseas Territories Act (2002) has reaﬃrmed full British
citizenship for the citizens of Britain’s remaining 15 small overseas territories. This
Act also grants: automatic transmission of citizenship to oﬀspring; the right of
abode, including the right to live and work in the United Kingdom and the
European Union; the right not to exercise or formally to renounce British
citizenship; and the right to use the fast-track European Union/European Economic
Area channel at the airport, free of UK immigration controls. In spite of these
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concessions, within the UKOTs, perhaps the tightest and most one-sided
arrangements for citizenship, residency and work permits are to be found in
Bermuda. Property ownership is highly restricted: expatriates may purchase only one
of some 312 homes listed as available for sale to non-Bermudians. Private houses in
this category are very limited, and prices start at around US$3.5 million (Global
Property Guide, 2009). In general, single-family dwellings in Bermuda with price
tags of less than US$5.5 million cannot be sold to foreign nationals (Bermuda
Online, 2010). Moreover, the Bermuda constitution protects Bermudians only:
although human rights exist, they do not apply to non-Bermudian residents in the
same ways as they do to Bermudians. The employment of non-Bermudians is
severely restricted and they cannot change employment without oﬃcial permission;
any work permits stipulate a speciﬁc employer. The key explanatory factor for such
‘very strict’ (Forbes, 2012) policies is the strong dependence on immigrant labour in
the Bermudan economy: the 2000 Census reported over 24% of all employees in the
country as non-Bermudans (Fogg and Harrington, 2005, p. 366).
Sovereign Rights by Indigenous Peoples
A second expression of governance ‘from below’ relates to a concerted global
movement for the recognition of aboriginal rights and their associated principles of
self-government and self-determination within the parameters of a sovereign state. A
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was adopted by the
General Assembly in 2006. This provides for the protection of the collective human
rights of indigenous peoples, including their rights to self-determination, culture,
spirituality, language, lands, territories and natural resources. It applies to over 5,000
distinct indigenous peoples, numbering over 300 million worldwide, many of whom
live on islands (UN, 2006).
Torres Strait Islanders, Australia. The right to ownership of land by Torres Strait
Islanders according to their traditional customs was recognised in a landmark
Australia High Court decision, Mabo vs State of Queensland, in 1992. This decision
recognised for the ﬁrst time native title rights and interests in common law. Torres
Strait Islanders now deal in substantial areas of land, and usually these lands are
held through some form of communal title (Aboriginal Law Bulletin, 1992; Russell,
2005). However, the recognition by common law of native title rights has highlighted
the diﬃculties of these arrangements. Indigenous communities own land under
customary law as self-regulating communities with distinct rights but cannot, under
current Australian statutes, organise their political structures in relation to this land.
There are also substantial diﬃculties even in identifying the ‘community’ that might
organise such structures (Scott and Mulrennan, 2010).
Paradiplomacy
The aﬃrmation of subnational territorial identity and jurisdictional competence can
only induce the elaboration of paradiplomatic relationships and thus reinforce the
blurring of distinctions of status and privilege that were once at the core of
international diplomatic practice. Paradiplomacy is the outreach of non-sovereign
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jurisdictions to actors beyond their own borders (Bartmann, 2006). Such
paradiplomacy has involved subnational governments setting up oﬃces in Brussels
(especially if located in Europe) or in other countries, within and outside the EU.
The (ambiguously named) 21-member Overseas Countries and Territories Associa-
tion (OCTA) is one such active lobby, set up by the Treaty of Rome in 1957
(European Commission, 2005).
The Faroes. The Faroe Islands have been a ‘self-governing community within the
Danish Realm’ since 1948; they have laid out a detailed ‘road map’ for eventual full
independence. Meanwhile, they currently maintain four representative oﬃces in
Brussels, Copenhagen, London and Reykjavik, with full diplomatic status. These
oﬃces ‘are located within the Danish embassies and the Faroese diplomats are
formally accredited to the respective host nations as Danish diplomats working with
Faroese aﬀairs’ (Isfeld, 2006). Moreover, since July 2005 the Faroese government
has been able—on its own—to enter into negotiations and conclude treaties with
other states and international organisations without previous consent from
Denmark regarding all areas that are under the Faroese authorities (Thomassen,
2011). There are plans to open three more embassies, and there are various consular
oﬃces in Torshavn, the Faroese capital, Brazil and Italy (vice consulates) as well as
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden and the United Kingdom (consulates) (Faroes Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs,
2010).
Economic Sovereignty
In some instances, the largesse associated with economic opportunity has been
shrewdly translated into political mileage. It is much easier to ﬂex jurisdictional
muscle when there are the ﬁnances required to back up or support any contemplated
initiatives.
Shetland, Scotland. The Shetland Islands were initially quite ambivalent about the
late-1960s discovery of North Sea Oil and the subsequent plans to turn Sullom Voe
into a major oil terminal facility, now owned by a consortium including British
Petroleum and Shell. Luckily, some shrewd policy-making secured exceptional
jurisdictional capacity for the local government. The Zetland County Council Act
approved in 1974 enabled the Shetland Island Council (SIC) to acquire land, become
a port authority, set up companies and establish a reserve fund (Blackadder, 1998,
pp. 109–110). These led to the SIC receiving in time substantial payments from the
oil industry, and proﬁts that were saved up in trust funds have been used to promote
tourism, knitwear, local enterprise and development (Butler and Fennell, 1994;
Baldacchino, 2005; Shetland Island Council, 2007). Although these trusts are
theoretically independent charitable organisations, they actually permit the SIC to
fund initiatives by proxy, circumventing UK and EU regulations that pertain to local
government transactions. Almost 10% of the Shetland labour force works directly
for the SIC (Grydehøj, 2008). It would be fair to claim that, today, the SIC is not
only the wealthiest but also the most autonomous local council in the United
Kingdom.
242 G. Baldacchino
Strategy Games Imposed on the Small
The view from the larger, richer, patron is markedly diﬀerent. From there, small
sovereign states, or autonomous sub-units within the purview of the state, could be
seen simply as troublesome upstarts, to be suﬀered and perhaps occasionally
appeased; but, they could also be seen as objects of design, regulatory spaces that can
be crafted and deliberately engineered by central governments (or their elites), eager
to exploit these spaces as distinctly (and preferably discreetly) ‘managed’ zones for
economic, commercial, military, or security-related activities in a globalised
economy—perhaps to the chagrin or despair of any local inhabitants. Small
jurisdictions, often islands surrounded by large swathes of ocean territory that they
can hardly patrol or exploit, make also ripe and willing targets for soft and
‘politically correct’ imperialism. Key areas where such unequal arrangements have
been secured to date regard: (1) reducing residency rights (at times to the extent of
evicting whole civilian populations); (2) excising spaces as non-jurisdictions; and (3)
creating spaces with speciﬁc regulatory frameworks, typically to facilitate certain
kinds of trade and business. As with the previous section, examples are provided for
each of these contested policy ﬁelds.
Contending with Residents on Geo-strategic Islands
Betermier (2004, p. 64) has suggested that metropolitan powers sometimes ‘choose to
retain’ territories in line with strategic self-interest and military expediency. The
situation is made easier when these metropolitan powers deal with small and island
spaces as tabulae rasae and do not, in particular, have to contend with civilian
residents and civil law obligations. A measure that improves the ability to use an
island for military or other geo-strategic purposes is to depopulate it completely and/
or engineer its exclusive habitation by military personnel. There are thus islands, and
island enclaves, in the world today that are populated by only ‘non-residents’ who
operate under military discipline.
Ascension. Private ownership of land has not been permitted on Ascension, a
UKOT; all residents are housed in employers’ quarters. Ascension has been
operated like a classic company town throughout its economic history. Conse-
quently it has never had a permanently settled population; labour on the island has
been subject to short-term contracts. This trend is expected to change over time,
however, as some devolution processes continue. The UK Government has
asserted that no inhabitant of Ascension Island has a ‘right to abode’: this is a
point now in dispute by local council members, long-time employees and their
family members, as noted in the local newspaper The Islander. With the 2003
Wideawake Agreement between the UK and the US, Wideawake Airﬁeld on
Ascension Island was opened to some civilian charter traﬃc. Previously, only
military traﬃc had been permitted. The introduction of tax, the setting up of an
electoral roll and the introduction of the right to vote led to ‘certain expectations’,
which were, however, quickly dashed (The Economist, 2010). A frustrated island
council resigned en bloc in 2006, its members claiming that they ‘have been used as
pawns by HMG [Her Majesty’s Government] to legitimize a regime that is
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questionable, discriminatory, dishonest and unfavourable to the taxpayers of this
island’ (St Helena Independent, 2007, p. 7; also see; Royle, 2004; Jones, 2009).
Legal Limbos
In relation to such threats as global terrorism and illegal migration, large states have
looked at small, subnational island spaces with creative governance practices in
mind, using them to hold detainees that they would rather not have on their own
territory. The relative distance from the mainland means that island detainees are
more diﬃcult to reach; are better hidden from the media, human-rights watchdogs
and the general public; and hindered in accessing judicial processes (Mountz, 2009,
p. 11).
Lampedusa, Italy. The southernmost point of Italy, the island of Lampedusa (land
area of 20 km2) is situated 205 km from the island region of Sicily (of which it forms
part administratively) but just 113 km from Tunisia. It is now best known as a key
entry point to Europe for impoverished illegal immigrants from Africa. Thousands
have been attempting the dangerous crossing across the Mediterranean Sea;
survivors located by the Italian coast guard have been held temporarily in a
detention centre on Lampedusa prior to being transferred elsewhere in Italy for
processing and especially for examining their case for asylum status (Green, 2006). In
2008, Italy ranked as the fourth-highest asylum host country in the industrialised
world, trailing only the United States, Canada and France. In August of that same
year, however, Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi externalised Italy’s borders to
Libya. Following a US$5 billion deal with the Libyan government, the international
waters between the two countries are more vigorously policed by joint naval patrols;
many immigrants rescued at sea are often returned to Libya, contrary to
international refugee rights. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees
(UNHCR) has expressed ‘mounting concern’ about this practice, as with the state of
the detention facilities on the island (e.g. France 24, 2009). The number of migrants
attempting the Mediterranean voyage had fallen dramatically since this Italy–Libya
pact came into force (Human Rights Watch, 2009), but has risen again following the
‘Arab Spring’ insurgencies in Tunisia and then Libya: over 20,000 landed in
Lampedusa in the ﬁrst quarter of 2011 (Vogel, 2011).
Manageable Havens at Arm’s Length for Trading and Interacting with the World
Export Processing Zones (EPZs) are clear examples of designated areas into which
companies can import raw materials or semi-ﬁnished goods, which they can then
ﬁnish and export (e.g. Palan, 1998, p. 634). Their legal regimen usually includes
relaxed labour and environmental laws, with preferential customs duties on selected
import items, thus presenting an attractive proposition to foreign export-oriented
capital. The EPZ becomes an enclave protected from the typically more stringent
regulatory framework of the rest of the country: in some exceptional cases, and to
prevent accusations of ‘two weights, two measures’, a whole island jurisdiction can
transform itself into an EPZ, as Mauritius has done, with a thriving garment
industry (e.g. World Bank, 1992).
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Small states or other subnational spaces can be fenced for other purposes, though.
One of the most common contemporary forms is oﬀshore ﬁnance and gaming. Most
oﬀshore ﬁnance centres are located on small and island territories. An exceedingly
low-tax environment—via low corporate taxes and business rates, generous capital
allowances, absence of capital gains tax, wealth tax, capital transfer tax, inheritance
tax, and death or estate duties, along with low personal income tax rates—goes a
long way towards attracting both manufacturing and service industries (Baldacchino
and Milne, 2000, p. 232), to the dismay of large continental countries, which
complain that such strategies do not constitute ‘fair competition’.
Macau. The smaller special autonomous region of China, Macau, is now the world’s
biggest casino centre, taking over from Las Vegas. This city state, originally an
island archipelago now largely turned peninsula, has 18,428 persons per square
kilometre, making it the most densely populated jurisdiction in the world. It also
received no less than 25 million visitors in 2010 (Macau Business, 2011). The gaming,
tourism and hospitality industry is estimated to contribute more than 50% of
Macau’s GDP and 70% of Macau government revenue. Macau is also an oﬀshore
ﬁnance centre, a tax haven and a free port without foreign-exchange-control regimes.
Gambling revenue in Macau soared 42% in 2011 to a record US$33.48 billion: more
than ﬁve times what analysts forecast for the Las Vegas Strip (O’Keeﬀe, 2012).
Seeking Full Sovereign Status
What is evident from these dynamics is that subnational units can target speciﬁc
functions and powers, which they then seek to secure: de facto, de jure or any which
way in between. Although always dependent on context, all the functions and powers
typically associated with sovereignty have been up for negotiation; but this is not to
neglect the drive and achievement of full independence from the equation. Admittedly,
the drive by former colonies pressing for, and achieving, full sovereignty has stalled
somewhat since Brunei Darussalam achieved its independence in 1984. Were it not for
Kosovo, Montenegro and East Timor – and excluding the three Paciﬁc ‘hybrid
jurisdictions’ referred to earlier – the latest quarter-century would have seen no
examples of small, newly independent states. Yet, there is no shortage of potential
candidates: the UN Special Committee on Decolonisation still monitors 16 ‘non-self-
governing territories’ (all but two—Gibraltar and Western Sahara—being islands).
Various other territories have decided that they would prefer to retain some aspects of
autonomy while remaining or seeking integration with their colonial power, rather than
seek to secede from it, at times after holding independence referenda. Indeed, various
subnational jurisdictions have secured a broader autonomy in recent decades. These
range from Canada’s province of Que´bec (perhaps the most glaring example) to Dutch
Curac¸ao and Sint Maartin (since 2010, ‘countries’ within the Kingdom of the
Netherlands, such as Aruba); and from Denmark’s Faroe Islands and Greenland, to
France’s Mayotte (since 2011, France’s 101st de´partement) and South Korea’s Jeju. All
these territories have beneﬁted from a larger measure of self-government while
remaining lodged within the purview of a larger, richer, metropolitan state.
Such autonomy is also more likely to be gained and secured where there are
movements or political parties agitating for full independence in these subnational
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territories. Que´bec has had two dramatic ‘independence referenda’ (in 1980 and
1995). In some cases, territories are bracing for eventual independence referenda
(Bougainville, New Caledonia, Scotland) or may entertain fresh referenda for the
same purpose (Tokelau, Nevis). There are independentist leaning parties or
movements in such diverse locales as A˚land, Bermuda, Bougainville, Corsica,
Balearics/Catalonia, the Basque country, Faroes, French Polynesia, Greenland,
Guam, Hawaii, Nevis, New Caledonia, Okinawa, Puerto Rico, Que´bec, Rodrigues,
Sardinia, Scotland, Sicily, Taiwan, Tobago, Wales and Zanzibar (Baldacchino and
Hepburn, 2012).
Such initiatives may appear surprising at a time when there are clear economic and
security advantages in being associated with a larger, richer, metropolitan patron.
For all its beneﬁts, sovereignty may prove powerless in stemming ﬁscal collapse:
Greece may be Iceland a case in point. Yet, strong arguments—cultural, ﬁscal,
economic and political—in favour of full independence remain. Many can arise out
of sheer frustration with existing autonomy arrangements. The presence and
activities of independence-leaning political parties and movements can also
contribute signiﬁcantly to the successful negotiation and securing of even more
generous measures of autonomy from (sometimes hesitant, sometimes accommodat-
ing, otherwise indiﬀerent) metropolitan powers. Peoples with a distinct history and
culture, often a distinct language—and often facilitated by islandness—can claim an
equally distinct ethnic/national identity, which then develops into what are seen as
rightful claims towards self-government or decolonisation, as supported by the
international community. This awareness and mobilisation can be facilitated by the
existence of autonomy arrangements that enable the territory to ﬂex its capacity, and
potential for even more self-government, as a political entity.
Yet, for the very same reasons, identiﬁable ethnic, cultural or linguistic minorities
within subnational units can become concerned with and militate against movements
towards secession. The aboriginal people of Northern Que´bec (primarily the Cree
and the Inuit) both vehemently resisted the possibility of having the province break
away from Canada, organising their own referenda on independence (where the
independence option was heavily rejected). The Shetland Islands are not supportive
of an independent Scotland; the citizens of the Marquesas are not keen on an
independent French Polynesia; and the citizens of the island of Suduroy are the least
keen on an independent Faroes. The presumed divisibility of potential new states can
become a major political issue in itself, liable to be exploited by the federalist camp.
Unlike small and single island territories, sprawling archipelagos (just like large
continental masses) are more likely to harbour a divergence of sentiments and views
on the attraction or otherwise of full independence (e.g. Royle, 2001, passim). Such
episodes have been played out in places such as Anguilla (which refused
independence as part of St-Kitts and Nevis and remains a UKOT) and Tuvalu
(which refused independence as part of larger Kiribati, and secured its own
independence).
Special Jurisdictional Windows
Cameron (2010) does well to argue that, from the 16th to the 20th century, the
political map of the world became increasingly consolidated and cluttered, full of
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state spaces constituted as interiors; but, more recently, a new suite of spaces—extra-
legal, ﬁctive, excised, oﬀshore—have been engineered, leading to tense debates as to
whether they signify ‘the end of sovereignty’ (Camilleri and Falk, 1992) or rather, as
this paper argues, the latest reincarnation of state power. Small territories—whether
sovereign states or autonomous subnational/non-sovereign jurisdictions—comprise
a constituency that allows a fairly clear exploration of these contemporary dynamics
in search of ‘xenotopia’ (Cameron, 2010), or special jurisdictional windows bent on
escaping regulation and convention (Prasad, 2004). Their size and associated
islandness often gives them signiﬁcant leverage and ‘room for manoeuvre’. We
should not be surprised that the island republic of Utopia, Thomas More’s
pioneering and quintessential special place, soon to celebrate its 500th anniversary,
was itself ‘constructed’ out of a peninsula (More, 1516).
If the ultimate task of governments is to secure ‘the welfare of the population’
(Foucault, 1991a, p. 100), then the task at hand includes the inculcation of suitable
desires, the conﬁguration of the right beliefs; in short, ‘the right manner of disposing
things’ (Foucault, 1991a, p. 95). This invisible hand of state rationality, or
‘governmental management’ (Elden, 2007, p. 30), is expansive; the ‘multiform tactics’
(ibid.) required to achieve this main goal know no bounds. While discipline needs to,
and can only, be applied intra-territorially (in prisons, schools, hospitals), security
necessitates bold extra-territorial adventures, especially for increasingly smaller states
and territories.
Conclusion
This paper has taken its cue from Foucault’s concept of governmentality as a ‘strategy
game’, looking at the ways in which small territories are playing out their international
relations, especially with respect to either one particular, larger and richer country
(typically, their current or former colonial power) or the federal entities of which they
currently, willy-nilly, form part. The existence of an extra-territorial body and third
party—such as the European Union—provides an additional layer to these
interventionist ‘technologies’ (Murray Li, 2007, p. 276), as both sides use these tools
to leverage and enhance their own negotiating position. Small states and territories
are, in this context, both victims and actors of these ‘procedures, techniques and
methods’ (Foucault, 1991b, p. 75). Their presumed ‘have or have not’ sovereign status
masks a more complex scenario where speciﬁc capacities of government can be sought,
and then defended and locked in constitutionally once obtained (by the small player);
or else selectively and deliberately applied or withdrawn (by the larger player).
Diﬀerent spaces are thus constituted as policy ﬁelds, and diﬀerent agents and target
groups assembled as amenable to being ‘worked on’. Thus, even a mini-jurisdiction
such as Pitcairn can survive, mainly by its successful claims and overtures—what
Foucault would deﬁne as ‘bio-politics’—to British taxpayers, American stamp
collectors and Filipino sailors: ‘the only cash economy of Pitcairn is the sale of
stamps and the sale of handicrafts to passing ships’ (Ridgell, 1995, p. 149).
From these technologies of power, one jurisdiction could beneﬁt; but, another
could lose: there is no respect for territorial boundaries, national loyalties, or
citizenship claims in these dynamics. In so privileging the smart resourcefulness of
jurisdiction, autonomy and canny ﬂexibility, small states and territories today play
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out and expose a crisis of government in the context of the current ideological
predominance, or ‘harmony’, of neo-liberalism (Lemke, 2001, p. 203). No wonder
governmentality is all the rage.
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